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The Paradox of Knowledge Creation in a  
High-Reliability Organization: A Case Study
Ivana Milosevic, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
A. Erin Bass, University of Nebraska Omaha
Gwendolyn M. Combs, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract
We employed an instrumental case study of a multisystem hydroelectric power pro-
ducer, a high-reliability organization (HRO), to explore how new knowledge is cre-
ated in a context in which errors may result in destruction, catastrophic consequences, 
and even loss of human life. The findings indicate that knowledge creation is multi-
level, nested within three levels of paradox: paradox of knowing, paradox of practice, 
and paradox of organizing. The combination of the lack of opportunity for errors with 
the dynamism of the HRO context necessitates that individuals work through multiple 
paradoxes to generate and formalize new knowledge. The findings contribute to the lit-
erature on knowledge creation in context by explicating the work practices associated 
with issue recognition, resolution, and refinement, and the formalization of knowledge 
in failure-intolerant organizations.
Keywords: case study; high-reliability organization (HRO); knowledge creation; para-
dox theory
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Nestled within the rugged mountains and shielded from the curious eye of outsiders, 
the power plant can best be described as a truly “elegant, beautiful lady.” Upon enter-
ing the gates, we saw that what makes it powerful is also what makes it perilous. In front 
of the main entrance stood a monument dedicated to those who lost their lives to this 
power plant’s construction. And if the exterior left anything uncertain, our first encoun-
ter with the massive machines revealed the immense power of this plant. Several events 
in its history stood as a reminder that a failure to appreciate the plant’s power may result 
in catastrophe. Thus, mistake- free operation of this plant is a continuous objective—and 
one that can be supported only by knowledge shared and created by those working in it 
amid massive, powerful, and at times dangerous machines. To operate reliably in such a 
context is to understand how knowledge expands and shapes every thought and action.
Knowledge in high-reliability organizations (HROs) takes a different form due to their 
ambiguous, continuously evolving, and dangerous nature (Bierly & Spender, 1995; La Porte 
& Consolini, 1991; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Weick and Roberts (1993: 357) describe HROs 
as organizations that require “nearly error-free operations all the time because otherwise 
they are capable of experiencing catastrophes.” In HROs, emphasis is placed on enacting 
repositories of knowledge and reinforcing established procedures and routines (McIver, 
Lengnick- Hall, Lengnick-Hall, & Ramachandran, 2013; Roberts, 1990). Individuals rely 
on an existing repertoire of routinized behavior to act swiftly, yet mindfully, when faced 
with a potentially dangerous problem (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006).
However, the dynamism of the HRO context often generates unpredictable and non-
routine problems where previous knowledge is insufficient and new knowledge must be 
created. Extant research suggests that in the face of nonroutine problems, experimenta-
tion and errors catalyze new knowledge creation (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001). In-
dividuals think through previously made errors to create new knowledge that can then be 
utilized in similar situations (McIver et al., 2013; Zhao, 2011). Yet relying on errors may 
be challenging in a context where a misstep can create fatal consequences. That is, “some 
organizations must not make serious errors because their work is too important and the 
effects of their failures too disastrous” (La Porte & Consolini, 1991: 19).
Given this, HROs require strict rules and careful enactment of current knowledge to 
ensure reliability (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). At the same 
time, these organizations must allow for rule breaking and questioning of current knowl-
edge when faced with poorly understood, nonroutine problems (McIver et al., 2013; Rob-
erts, 1990). In other words, in HROs, individuals must both enact and challenge current 
knowledge as they search for solutions to the problem amid potentially hazardous circum-
stances. Therefore, the process of knowledge creation in HROs seems to be paradoxical: 
Individuals must enact current knowledge to comprehend a given problem, but also chal-
lenge current knowledge because it may not be appropriate for solving the problem (Ga-
rud, Dunbar, & Bartel, 2010; Roberts, 1990). The idea of paradoxes in HROs has been sug-
gested (Roberts, 1990), but, to our knowledge, not conceptually or empirically explored.
Building on the paradoxical nature of knowledge in HROs, we ask this: How is new 
knowledge created in this context? We take an emic approach to explore paradoxes within 
the knowledge creation process in the dangerous context of HROs. We follow the frame-
work put forth by Nonaka and colleagues (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Von Krogh, 2009), who 
conceptualize knowledge creation as a process consisting of two interrelated phases—
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knowledge emergence and knowledge formalization. Knowledge emergence occurs when 
existing knowledge boundaries are crossed, facilitating a cognitive change and develop-
ment of new insights (Tsoukas, 2009). Knowledge formalization involves the reshaping, 
clarification, and integration of these new insights into the organizational knowledge sys-
tem (De Boer, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 1999).
To further our understanding of knowledge creation in HROs, we apply insights from 
paradox theory (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox theory recog-
nizes tensions arising from the coexistence of opposing forces in organizations (Leana & 
Barry, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Paradox turns one’s attention away from simplifica-
tion toward the relationships between opposing phenomena, creating more complex the-
orizing. Despite its promise, however, few studies move from recognizing paradoxes in 
organizations to theorizing about how these paradoxes are experienced and navigated in 
practice (Lewis, 2000). In this study, we acknowledge paradoxes inherent in our phenom-
enon of interest and endeavor to understand how individuals experience and navigate 
paradoxes to create new knowledge.
Our main contribution is creating a framework of knowledge creation in context that 
illustrates the interrelatedness of knowledge emergence and knowledge formalization, 
and embodies the paradoxes that individuals navigate to create new knowledge. Al-
though previous research recognizes the paradoxical properties of knowledge (Kumar, 
2011; Leonard- Barton, 1992), to our knowledge no empirical research has explored the 
nature of these paradoxes and their formative importance to the knowledge creation 
process. Thus, our findings extend theory in three ways. First, we extend understanding 
of knowledge in organizations by explicating three levels of paradox embedded within 
the knowledge creation process: paradox of knowing that exists in the tension between 
the known and the unknown, paradox of practice that illustrates the struggle associated 
with the integration of the new insights, and paradox of organizing that encapsulates 
tensions related to the organizational structure. Second, in providing a clearer, theory-
driven definition of HROs, we extend theory by illustrating (a) the nature of interde-
pendencies that make HROs hazardous and (b) the paradoxes embedded in this context. 
Finally, we interweave our findings with the literature to problematize the current un-
derstanding of knowledge in organizations and theorize how insights from HROs may 
extend to non-HRO contexts.
Using a Paradox Lens to Understand Knowledge Creation in HROS
Paradox Theory
Organizational research tends to favor consistency, linearity, and stability to allow for 
more elegant theorizing and consequently, more precise implications (Whetten, 1989). 
Yet, this elegant theorizing is often critiqued for its inability to capture the complexities 
and paradoxes inherent in social organizing (Eisenhardt, 2000; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011). To this end, embracing paradox can be useful as it may facilitate 
generation of new theoretical and practical insight (Farjoun, 2010; Lado, Boyd, Wright, 
& Kroll, 2006). For example, Smith and Lewis (2011) argue that an organization’s sur-
vival is partially dependent on its ability to respond to paradoxical tensions; Lado et al. 
(2006) suggest that the theoretical and practical promise of the resource-based view is 
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possible only when its inherent paradox is embraced; and Coff, Coff, and Eastvold (2006) 
emphasize the importance of paradox to the management of organizational knowledge.
Paradox is the coexistence of two opposing states that are logical in isolation but ir-
rational when placed together (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Even a 
cursory view of organizational literature is sufficient to recognize that this coexistence 
permeates the most fundamental organizational issues such as the struggle between inno-
vation and efficiency (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), change and stability (Farjoun, 2010; Leana & Barry, 2000), or 
the known and the unknown (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; Lewis, 2000; O’Reilly & Tush-
man, 2008). For example, the paradox of change and stability allows researchers to tran-
scend the question of whether organizations are stable systems or a result of emergent ac-
tivities (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009) by interrelating the tension 
between regularity (stability) and adaptability (change) (Eisenhardt, 2000; Leana & Barry, 
2000). Embracing paradox provides insight into how moderate experimentation (change-
oriented activities) can foster increased reliability (stability-oriented activities) (Farjoun, 
2010) and why routine procedures may be critical for working through the nonroutine 
(Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012).
Organizations also tend to experience a continuous struggle between what is already 
known and what needs to be discovered. This paradox of known and unknown emerges 
as contexts change and new problems arise, making previous knowledge obsolete (Ku-
mar, 2011; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Knowledge that once en-
abled success may subsequently play a role in organizational failure through galvanized 
“core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992). To this end, previous research emphasizes er-
rors as triggers to break rigidities imposed by previous understanding (Catino & Patriotta, 
2013; Zhao, 2011). New knowledge is created as errors are detected, corrected, and ana-
lyzed, thus expanding the repertoire of available responses (Farjoun, 2010; Madsen, 2009).
Although new knowledge creation through the analysis of errors is useful in “failure-
tolerant” organizations (Edmondson, 1999), this may not be viable in contexts in which 
errors generate hazardous consequences, such as HROs (Bierly & Spender, 1995; La Porte 
& Consolini, 1991). Thus, a tension exists in the need to create knowledge via explora-
tion and discovery (both of which are often error-laden) while maintaining error-free, re-
liable operation. Recognizing this, Roberts (1990: 160-161) asks, “How adequate can such 
a literature [based on trial and error] be when addressing phenomena at least partially de-
rived from precisely the opposite conditions?”
High-Reliability Organizations
Research on HROs stems from work on high-risk systems (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Per-
row, 1984), or systems that (a) have potential to create hazardous consequences such as 
large-scale accidents and fatalities, (b) are characterized by complex interactions, and (c) 
are tightly coupled. Complex interactions are “of unfamiliar sequence, or unplanned and 
unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible” (Per-
row, 1984: 78). Tightly coupled entails the proximity between interacting components 
so that what happens in one affects what happens in another. In essence, risk is created 
in this context because of the existence of interacting components that can produce un-
planned or nonroutine events that are difficult to immediately comprehend.
Th e Pa ra d ox o f  Kn o w l e d g e  cr e aT i o n i n  a  hi g h-re l i a B i l i T y  or g a n i z aT i o n     5
Although Perrow (1984) did not differentiate among hazard, risk, and reliability, sub-
sequent research recognized that although high-risk organizations are capable of catas-
trophes, rarely does one in fact occur (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Roberts, 
1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Indeed, although these organizations are high-hazard in 
the sense that they have high potential to generate catastrophic events, the risk is low be-
cause the probability that such event will take place is minimized through emphasis on 
reliability (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990). This insight shifted exploration 
from what makes these organizations risky to what makes them reliable (Bierly & Spender, 
1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). Reliability in HROs expounds from technical 
expertise, systemwide processes, and a strong focus on learning (La Porte & Consolini, 
1991; Roberts, 1990). Weick et al. (2008) further suggest that what makes HROs reliable 
is full attention on failure and emphasis on complex understanding, resilience, and ap-
preciation of experience when faced with potentially catastrophic events.
Despite this focused description, the HRO term has been applied in less precise ways— 
many complex, tightly coupled systems are in fact not hazardous, and many hazardous 
systems are loosely coupled with low accidents rates (Leveson et al., 2009). We build on 
previous HRO research and define HROs as organizations that are capable of producing ca-
tastrophes (not just errors but consequences that can endanger multiple constituents) but 
are also characterized by systemwide processes (i.e., knowledge creation) that help maintain 
mistake-free operation despite their hazardous nature (Farjoun, 2010; Leveson et al., 2009).
Knowledge creation in HROs. The HRO context requires individuals to oscillate between 
applying knowledge in predictable, routine events and creating new knowledge in unpre-
dictable, nonroutine events (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Although previous research recog-
nized that knowledge facilitates reliability in HROs (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Weick et 
al., 2008), insight into how this occurs is fragmented at best. For example, studies suggest 
that when prior experience is relevant to a problem, individuals rely on that experience 
to generate a timely solution (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; McIver et al., 2013). An assump-
tion is that individuals have complete knowledge and are able to enact that knowledge 
appropriately (McIver et al., 2013). However, this assumption may not hold for several 
reasons. First, individuals may lack the relevant knowledge due to deficiencies in train-
ing or preparation (Leveson et al., 2009). Second, the problem may not be part of the cur-
rent organizational knowledge repertoire (i.e., the problem is unknown) (La Porte & Con-
solini, 1991). Third, the context may be dynamic, requiring more variety in response to 
generate the solution (Farjoun, 2010). Here, we focus on the creation of new knowledge 
when faced with unknown problems in the dynamic HRO context.
Circumstances often arise in HROs where unknown problems necessitate the creation 
of new knowledge. In non-HRO contexts, small errors and near misses are often useful in 
creating new knowledge in response to unknown problems (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatake-
naka, 2002; Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Morris & Moore, 2000). However, errors 
and near misses may produce catastrophic consequences in HROs due to their dynamic na-
ture. In HROs, new knowledge must be created through the focus on reliable, error-free op-
eration. Therefore, we have somewhat contradictory understanding of (a) how individuals 
work through problems without errors to generate new knowledge and (b) how new knowl-
edge is formalized and integrated into the organizational knowledge system. In this arti-
cle we illustrate a two-phase process through which new knowledge is created in an HRO.
6 Mi l o s e v i c ,  Ba s s ,  & co M B s i n  Jo u r n a l  o f  Ma n a g e M e n t  (2015) 
Research Method
Research Setting
General HRO context. The setting for this study is a hydroelectric energy producer, 
“Marion,” located in Southeastern Europe. Marion is composed of four units comprising 
nine hydroelectric energy power plants that are functionally interconnected and interde-
pendent with one another: Unit “BB,” Unit “LIM,” Unit “ZB,” and Unit “CAC.” At the time 
the BB unit began operation in 1966, it was one of the largest hydroelectric power produc-
ers in the region. Over time (1974-1982), a series of additions and reorganizations (CAC 
and ZB merged with BB in 1992 and the LIM system was added in 2005) increased Mar-
ion’s size, but also facilitated knowledge sharing and reliable operation across all plants. 
Cross-plant meetings and integrated reliability procedures increased Marion’s production 
capability as well as ensured a more standardized approach to safety.
Marion is an HRO because, on one hand, it is capable of experiencing hazardous events, 
but on the other, it maintains relatively reliable performance through systemwide pro-
cesses. The potential to produce hazardous events stems from the dangerous materials 
individuals work with and the large machines that are interconnected and can, as our 
participants indicated, act unpredictably. To maintain reliable performance, Marion has 
specific procedures for operation, extensive training and debriefings, and invited safety 
inspections. This preoccupation with reliability (Weick et al., 2008) ensures the most ap-
propriate conduct permeates all organizational levels—from engineers working directly 
with the machines to executives overseeing the organization.
Local context. Nested within the general HRO context is the event-specific local con-
text. Due to the hazardous and continually changing nature of the plants in the Marion 
system, events occur that, if not immediately attended to, could create systemwide fail-
ure. In some instances, those events are routine in the sense that individuals have en-
countered them before and can utilize current knowledge to neutralize them. In other in-
stances, the events are nonroutine with unknown causes, rendering current knowledge 
incomplete and requiring the generation of new knowledge.
Routine events (such as precautionary adjustments, fine-tuning, or minor problems) are 
important because they prevent serious consequences from occurring. Although routine 
events are often viewed as stable and repetitive activities that ensure consistency in or-
ganizing, they are also dynamic, thus precluding the existence of any two perfectly simi-
lar routine events and inciting slight adjustment and adaptation of individuals’ responses 
and actions (Cohen, 2007; Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & Rindova, 2012). Due to the dy-
namism embedded in the routine events, knowledge created through them entails a re-
finement and/or augmentation of current knowledge.
Nonroutine events often arise as small, controllable problems but have the potential to 
escalate into systemwide catastrophes because the nature of the problem is not immedi-
ately known. As such, relying on existing knowledge is insufficient in this situation. New 
knowledge must be created to define the event and neutralize it to avoid error and main-
tain reliable operation of the plant (Garud et al., 2010; Tsoukas, 2009). To contextualize 
our findings, we begin with a description of an instance in which a routine event rapidly 
transformed into a nonroutine event.
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During a scheduled inspection of the BB power plant, a mistake triggered a series of 
unexpected, catastrophic events. During this inspection, an individual’s continual aware-
ness of the equipment sparked observation that oil levels in the power switch were low. 
Rather than initially inquiring into why this was occurring, this individual reached over 
for closer inspection. In doing so, the routine event (low oil levels) escalated into an ex-
tremely hazardous nonroutine event. The supervisor yelled out to get the individual’s at-
tention. However, it was a matter of seconds before the individual closed the electric cir-
cuit, resulting in electric shock and serious bodily injury.
The supervisor and two other employees rushed to the individual and immediately 
administered first aid. Other workers, though visibly disturbed by the event, had to re-
focus their attention and tend to the malfunctioning machine that now was acting com-
pletely erratically. At this point, standard procedures did not aid in the analysis and re-
sponse to the problem. This was because the problem, at this point, was nonroutine. The 
workers engaged in initial inquiry to discover distinctive characteristics of the event and 
coordinate insights by sharing and recombining their experiences. The next 10 hours 
were critical. The team stayed on the premises, carefully adjusting the machine through 
knowledgeable action, while simultaneously tending to the accident. Once a preliminary 
solution was generated, the supervisor immediately contacted BB plant executives to ar-
range a localized meeting so that the emergent insights could be refined and integrated 
into the formal knowledge structure. We utilize this event in the coming paragraphs to 
contextualize our findings.
Data Collection Procedures
We adopted an emic approach to explore knowledge creation “from within” and cap-
ture the insider’s view of the process. We conducted an instrumental case study (Stake, 
1995) and used multiple sources of data including formal interviews, informal conver-
sations, observations, and archival data such as internal documents, governmental re-
ports, and news articles. Triangulation of data sources improved the robustness of the 
findings (Creswell, 2007).
Interviews. The primary data source was 17 semistructured interviews conducted one-
onone with participants either in their private offices or in a meeting room in Marion. In 
addition, we talked to participants informally during observation and transportation to 
different units in the Marion system (distances ranged from several minutes to 2 hours 
away). We first interviewed the general counsel and the health and safety manager. These 
individuals were our key informants because they are highly knowledgeable about Mar-
ion, its practices, and events that occurred throughout its history. In the second round of 
interviews, we spoke with the general managers of each power plant. From there, we used 
a snowball sampling technique to identify others who were involved with, or had sub-
stantial information about, knowledge practices in Marion. The interviewees were pre-
dominantly male (15 males and 2 females—the workforce was predominately male), av-
eraging 15 years of experience with Marion.
Observation. The first author spent every work day for the first 4 weeks of the study at 
the site, traveling between plants and spending time with employees both at and outside 
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work. During this time, the first author had several opportunities to observe meetings as 
well as employee interactions. Observation allowed us to gain insight into the regular op-
eration of the organization as well as appreciate its tightly coupled and hazardous nature. 
Observing the machines and the interaction of engineers with the machines allowed us 
to further contextualize our findings as well as to experience practice from the view of 
the participants. An observational protocol was used to record “descriptive” and “reflec-
tive” accounts of knowledge- related activities (Creswell, 2007).
Archival data. Though we did not rely extensively on archival data, they provided 
useful historical information that helped us appreciate Marion’s hazardous nature. Par-
ticularly helpful was documentation tracing the history of the organization, documen-
tation describing the nature of the equipment, and a book containing performance and 
safety information for each plant over the past 20 years. Archival data also highlighted 
the importance and continuous revision of safety procedures.
Data Analysis 
Driven by the extant literature, we started data collection with the intent to under-
stand how individuals in Marion make decisions (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et 
al., 2009). However, when we asked if there is anything we need to know that we did not 
cover in our questions, our key informants replied that to understand Marion we must 
understand the importance of knowledge for reliable operation. Based on this insight, we 
revised our research question and successive data collection activities. Subsequent stages 
were marked with iterative movement between data collection, data analysis, and the lit-
erature to refine the logic of our emergent themes.
In the initial stages of our analysis, we focused on three categories of codes: expected 
codes (e.g., interaction of more and less experienced individuals; the importance of no-
ticing unusual signals), surprising codes (e.g., flexibility rather constancy of experience), 
and unusual codes (e.g., paradoxes that individuals experience and navigate to create new 
knowledge) (Creswell, 2007). Initial codes formed the first-order codes in the data struc-
ture. In the following stage, we used the coding process to generate a description of the 
setting and identify researcher-induced themes embodying the knowledge creation pro-
cess (Creswell, 2007). This gave rise to second-order codes that allowed a more holistic 
understanding of the data (Bansal & Corley, 2012). Our approach to coding resulted in 
the data structure reported in Table 1. In the last stage, we interwove the interpretation 
of the findings with the literature to construct the final narrative.
To confirm the validity of our findings, we utilized triangulation, member checking, 
and thick description (Creswell, 2007). First, we searched for convergence across differ-
ent sources by interviewing individuals from different levels of the hierarchy and from 
different plants. We triangulated our findings with observational and archival data. We 
also asked our informants if the themes that we identified made sense and whether our 
overall description reflected their experiences. This resulted in further refinement of our 
findings. Finally, we employed thick description in the presentation of our findings. We 
provide rich, detailed, emic insight into the practices that constitute knowledge creation 
in Marion as experienced by our participants.
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Findings
To illustrate the knowledge creation process in HROs, we present our findings in two 
phases: knowledge emergence (Phase 1) and knowledge formalization (Phase 2). Our 
findings show that the knowledge creation process takes on two separate paths depend-
ing on the local context (routine or nonroutine event) (Figure 1). During the knowledge 
emergence phase (Phase 1) occurring within routine events, individuals rely on their 
experiences, recombination of those experiences, and localized discourse to select the 
most appropriate solution from an existing knowledge repertoire and adapt it to the con-
tingencies of the situation. Once the solution is selected and adapted, the formaliza-
tion phase (Phase 2) entails the refinement and/or augmentation of the informal knowl-
edge structure. Conversely, during nonroutine events, the knowledge emergence phase 
(Phase 1) involves individuals first defining the problem through initial inquiry and 
coordination then combining their experiences through knowledgeable action to gen-
erate, rather than select, a solution tailored to the situation. In nonroutine events, the 
knowledge formalization phase (Phase 2) involves immediate discussion of the solu-
tion via localized meetings, leading to prompt integration of the emergent insight into 
the formal knowledge structure.
Our findings reveal that individuals experience three levels of paradox—individual, 
collective, and organizational—in the knowledge creation process. At the individual level, 
Figure 1. The Knowledge Creation Process Along Two Paths in a High-Reliability Organization
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the paradox of knowing uncovers the struggle individuals experience as they work to cat-
egorize an event as routine or nonroutine and generate a preliminary understanding of 
the problem. At the collective level, the paradox of practice uncovers the struggle embed-
ded in the distributed nature of knowledge in action and the coexistence of the formal 
and informal knowledge structures. Finally, at the organizational level, the paradox of or-
ganizing uncovers the tension between stability and change that permeates the entire or-
ganization, thus shaping the knowledge creation process in its entirety. These paradoxes 
are depicted in Figure 2. Select participants’ descriptions are interwoven throughout our 
findings, while others are provided in Table 2.
Phase 1 of the Knowledge Creation Process: New Knowledge Emergence
The importance of knowing existing procedures in Marion is exemplified in the writ-
ten rules and procedures posted on the walls of each plant in view of the employees on 
their way to the machine area. Employees interweave these procedures in their work to 
ensure reliable performance. However, the complex nature of Marion occasionally gen-
erates unpredictable and nonroutine events in which current procedures may not be ap-
plicable. When they occur, individuals heedfully interrelate to connect “sufficient indi-
vidual know-how to meet situational demands” (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 366), collectively 
decreasing the possibility of catastrophe. In exploring how individuals in Marion heed-
fully interrelate to create new knowledge, we discovered five themes: continual aware-
ness, initial inquiry, coordination processes, experience, and knowledgeable action.
Figure 2. Three Levels of Paradox Existing Within the Knowledge Creation Process  
in a High-Reliability Organization
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Continual awareness (Dimension 1 of the knowledge creation process). HROs are fun-
damentally dynamic in that even the most routine events and slight irregularities may 
quickly transform into hazardous ones (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1984). In this 
context, changes are seen as warning signs that ought to be evaluated to prevent failure 
(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2012). As a consequence, indi-
viduals must continually be aware of their surroundings and attune to familiar and less 
familiar signals.
Table 2. Themes, Codes, and Data of Knowledge Creation in a High-Reliability Organization
Theme  Code  Representative Data
The process 1. Continual “Simply put, it is all about monitoring the condition of the
of new     awareness     machines . . . to know when something can be done by the way
knowledge      the equipment looks like. There are criteria that you have to
emergence      know and to watch for to know what is going on.”
 2. Initial inquiry  “The problem is solved through asking questions. When I am not  
      sure what is going on I ask others.”
 3. Coordination “. . . when things go wrong, one man even when he has the greatest 
     processes     knowledge of it all cannot solve it . . . there need to be others 
      who will ask questions or subquestions and help find the way 
      that is the best.”
 4. Recombination of “[Experience] is significant. For 37 years a lot to see and learn. . . . 
     experiences     It simply means you know how to follow the process, how to 
      manage the production and so on.”
 5. Knowledgeable “There were some abnormalities in the aggregate and we could not 
     action     figure out the problem . . . so we decided to stop it and analyze 
      the levels and the problem was solved.”
The 6. The informal “It is within the organization itself, if we see that something
formalization     knowledge     became a practice and it is good . . . it brings good and it is not
of new     structure     part of the formal system, we make it a part, we regulate it.
practices 7. The formal “They are essential [formal procedures] and you have to know 
     knowledge     them. The production of electric energy brings with it issues 
     structure     that are dangerous for people and environment . . . and we 
      have to deal with that. We need to know and act according to 
      the procedures in each situation. . . . They help you solve the 
      problems.”
HRO context  8. Nature of the “There are these demands, pressures stemming from the system 
     HRO context:     [procedures] to operate according to them . . . and there is a 
     interdependencies     question of how to maintain all of it, and still operate by the 
     and hierarchy     rules . . . it is a balancing act . . . you need to estimate whether 
      something can pass, skip over some rule. What the risk would 
      be given the problem you are facing and what the constraints 
      are.”
 •• Routine events  “We operate under the specifications of the annual plan. In  
      situations where something out of the ordinary happens we  
      deal with that at the spot. . . . When the issue is simple and I  
      have all the information I need, I act in accordance to my  
      experience and procedures.”
 •• Nonroutine events  “Not everything can be specified ahead of time . . . the plant is  
      a process, a living thing . . . something is always happening . . .  
      you have to be technically correct and safe and to address each  
      and every element when something does not look right.”
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This awareness coupled with prolonged, careful observation of the behavior of the ma-
chines and understanding how the machines should behave (e.g., normal idiosyncratic 
sounds versus abnormal sounds that suggest immediate correction is needed) enables in-
dividuals to anticipate when something is, or could be, wrong. An engineer explained that 
“incidents may occur out of the blue and many things can be detected earlier if you watch 
carefully for them.” In other words, “watch[ing] for them” allows individuals to anticipate 
an event and engage in activities necessary to neutralize threats to reliable operation. As 
such, employees do frequent “rounds of the equipment” to observe their operations. Dur-
ing observations they focus on (a) visual cues, (b) sounds, (c) smells, and (d) movements, 
relying on their knowledge to differentiate between those that are regular from those that 
are irregular. The reliance on all senses is not surprising, as previous research implies that 
acute awareness stems from the senses, enabling individuals to anticipate and respond to 
situational changes (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Tsoukas, 2009). Acute awareness enables 
Marion employees to recognize cues that something might be out of the ordinary:
It started with one man during his regular round of the aggregate . . . he heard a 
sound coming from the turbine that was somewhat different than normal and in-
stantaneously notified others.
However, continual awareness does not, in itself, allow individuals to categorize the 
event as routine or not. For example, in the event described above, the engineer engaged 
in continual awareness by noticing that the oil levels in the power switch were unusually 
low. The awareness allowed the engineer to notice the irregular signal, but was insuffi-
cient, as subsequent events indicate, to properly categorize the event. To do so and corre-
spondingly trigger the appropriate set of actions, individuals must engage in initial inquiry.
Initial inquiry (Dimension 2 of the knowledge creation process). Once they notice an ir-
regularity, employees in Marion engage in questioning to generate a preliminary under-
standing and classify the event as routine or nonroutine. Immersion into a dialogue with 
knowledgeable others fosters a setting in which individuals question their own assump-
tions and search for links between contradictions and diverse insights (Ford & Ford, 1994; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011). These links establish shared understanding that enables context-
specific actions (Turner & Rindova, 2012). Initial inquiry is akin to Weick and Roberts’s 
(1993) heedful interrelating in that individuals flip through their mental repositories as 
well as the repositories of others to form connections between their know-how and the 
contingencies of the situation. This inquiry is dialectic with questions spiraling out of 
other questions until the individuals tentatively agree on the categorization of the event.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as routine, initial inquiry 
acts as a recollection mechanism through which individuals exploit collective knowledge 
and build initial insight necessary to incite the appropriate action. In routine events, in-
dividuals transition relatively quickly from initial inquiry to recombination of their di-
verse experiences to select the most appropriate solution from the repertoire of current 
knowledge practices (Figure 2). The transition is particularly vague as the recombination 
of experiences commences almost simultaneously with initial inquiry. The fact that the 
“solution is never the same” illustrates the dynamism, and at times complexity, of routine 
events, which consequently creates a space for new knowledge emergence even within a 
“known” event. A plant manager explained the process:
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When we estimate that the issue is simple, and when there is already a procedure in 
place, we generate several possible solutions . . . we lay them down side by side, and 
analyze how to use them. . . . When this occurs, I rely on workers closest to the issue. 
And you have to understand, the solution is never the same. There always needs to 
be explanation of why this solution was chosen and how it changed.
In contrast, as depicted in Figure 1, when the event is categorized as nonroutine, in-
dividuals utilize initial inquiry to determine “what the event is not and what should not 
be done.” Individuals make sense of their experiences by engaging in thought experi-
ments, contemplating what could have been and what could happen in the future (Morris 
& Moore, 2000). Determining what the event is not is a form of a thought experiment in 
which individuals utilize their knowledge not to select the solution (as in routine events), 
but to explore the boundaries of the event and discard irrelevant information. By explor-
ing what the event is not, individuals minimize opportunities for inappropriate action 
(this process did not take place in our example, resulting in improper action). One engi-
neer explained this as a process of “consultation” with colleagues, while another stated, 
“When I am unsure what is happening, I always consult with others.”
Coordination processes (Dimension 3 of the knowledge creation process). In routine 
events, individuals rely on their experiences and recombination of those experiences to 
select the most appropriate solution to resolve the issue (Schulz, 2001). In contrast, dur-
ing nonroutine events, initial inquiry transitions into coordination processes during which 
individuals collectively build understanding about the event. They do so by dynamically 
iterating between various alternatives (Leveson et al., 2009; Smith & Lewis, 2011), facil-
itating a string of microadaptations in an effort to form preliminary agreement regarding 
what the event is. This is in line with what Weick (1987) and Bierly and Spender (1995) 
term “rich analysis.” Collectives engage in rich analysis because each person in the col-
lective is both an individual observer and a dependent of the collective. As multiple in-
dividuals engage in raw talk and adjust to each other’s insights, new knowledge emerges 
(Bierly & Spender, 1995). To support this, one of our participants explained that even those 
with the most experience cannot know everything. Individuals must ask questions and 
listen to others (i.e., adjust to differing insights), “always look[ing] to get mutual agree-
ment” so that new knowledge can emerge:
When a major intervention is necessary and an action is needed . . . there must 
be coordination between me and the manager, either technical or production 
manager and a few others—mostly those in the plant when the intervention 
is needed . . . and we always look to get mutual agreement.
Individual-level paradox: Paradox of knowing in the knowledge creation process. Contin-
ual awareness is a trigger for the knowledge creation process. Once individuals become 
aware of the event, initial inquiry enables them to codify it as routine or nonroutine, thus 
activating one of the two paths of knowledge creation (Figure 1). This process also gives 
rise to the individual-level paradox: paradox of knowing. That is, the awareness of the 
event requires timely action—often within minutes. However, improper action may have 
grave consequences, as illustrated in the example above. As such, individuals must simul-
taneously utilize and question their current knowledge to make appropriate distinctions 
and generate a preliminary understanding of the event (routine or nonroutine). Previous 
knowledge is critical because it allows them to identify known patterns (Farjoun, 2010; 
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Pentland et al., 2012). At the same time, failure to challenge existing knowledge may re-
sult in premature action and potential escalation of the event. Consequently, individuals 
must resist simplification and remain in a state of paradox between the known and the 
unknown—that is, paradox of knowing. Given this, we offer the following proposition:
Proposition 1a: In HROs, individuals’ reliance on their existing knowledge while simultane-
ously questioning it builds understanding and decreases the possibility of error during 
knowledge emergence.
In the context of nonroutine events, initial inquiry acts as impetus for coordination pro-
cesses. In this transition, individuals open up space for multiple interpretations of what 
is happening by interweaving their insights with that of others. Individuals rely on their 
knowledge to critically evaluate the knowledge of others as they identify known aspects 
of the event and search for ways to infuse new sense into the situation. In doing so, in-
dividuals simultaneously reinforce and challenge each other’s understanding to, on one 
hand, solidify what is known and, on the other, prevent previous knowledge from cloud-
ing discovery. Given this, we propose,
Proposition 1b: In HROs, when the event is unknown, simultaneous sharing and challenging 
of insights from multiple individuals through coordination processes expands the knowl-
edge base while decreasing the possibility of error.
Recombination of experiences (Dimension 4 of the knowledge creation process). Experi-
ence is a driving force behind initial inquiry and the ability to dynamically adjust to oth-
ers to comprehend the event. It enables individuals to more clearly articulate what the 
event is not by comparing it to events that have occurred previously (Morris & Moore, 
2000). For example, Langley and Tsoukas (2010: 4) argue that experiences incorporate the 
past and the present: “Unlike substances, which do not include one another but are seen 
as nested, standing under one another—sub-stantia—experiences include other experi-
ences and grow out of the integration of bodily and mental events into something new.” 
In other words, individuals recombine their various experiences and make them relevant 
to the local contingencies (Schulz, 2001). Indeed, recombination of experiences tends to 
enhance reliability in contexts facing frequent perturbations and unpredictability, such 
as HROs (Farjoun, 2010).
Bourdieu’s (1990: 54) description of experience as “a product of history. . . . It ensures 
the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of 
schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the correctness of practices 
and their constancy over time” was relevant to our findings. However, rather than con-
stancy of practice, experience at Marion enables flexibility of practice. Flexibility of prac-
tice is evident in the practitioners’ engagement with practice, their anticipation of what 
might happen next, and their adjustment to that anticipation (Lewis, 2000; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015). Whether in a routine or nonroutine event, individuals know that they 
must at least partially adapt (routine events) or critically challenge (nonroutine events) 
each practice. Flexible experience allows individuals to make the knowledge relevant to 
a given situation and appropriately react to ambiguous stimuli. It enables them to engage 
“all [their senses] into the discovery”:
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When a malfunction occurs, based on your extensive experience, you know how to 
react . . . you use all your senses and you know how to react. These experiences are 
valuable and necessary, without it you cannot work.
Knowledgeable action (Dimension 5 of the knowledge creation process). During routine 
events, knowledgeable action entails application of the selected solution to neutralize the 
event. Based on initial inquiry and recombination of experiences, individuals collectively 
identify the most appropriate solution that is then carefully applied to the problem (Mc-
Iver et al., 2013). Thus, there is a distinct separation of thought and action. In contrast, 
during nonroutine events, the separation of initial inquiry and recombination of experi-
ences is blurred, making it difficult to discern where one begins and the other ends. Ques-
tioning and coordination are still occurring at the moment individuals decide to act. It is 
through “articulation [that] practitioners obtain a clearer understanding of what they do 
by becoming aware of the distinctions they have been following” (Tsoukas, 2009: 943). 
Articulation occurring during questioning and coordination allows individuals to more 
fully comprehend what is transpiring and enact their knowledge in a more mindful man-
ner, thus decreasing the possibility of error. The action, in turn, generates pieces of in-
formation to be internalized for new knowledge to emerge. During routine events, the in-
coming pieces of information reinforce and augment the current knowledge structure. 
These minor adjustments become a part of the collective understanding. During nonrou-
tine events, incoming pieces of information catalyze new knowledge emergence. The ac-
tion is needed “at the right time” to generate the influx of novelty necessary to compre-
hend the situation (Pentland et al., 2012; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). That is, individuals 
can understand the situation only through their actions, and actions can be known only 
after they occur (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). The influx of novelty relaxes current under-
standing, opening up space for knowledge emergence. One of our informants described 
knowledgeable action as inseparable from problem solution:
There was this problem with the aggregate . . . we weren’t sure what was going on . . 
. after discussion with the men on the floor we decided to turn the aggregate off, but 
the problem continued . . . so we turned off all the machines because we realized 
that there was no more time to wait. We had to act fast.
Collective-level paradox: Paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process. As much 
as experience drives initial inquiry and coordination, inquiry and coordination also en-
rich experience. Our participants described nonroutine events as a “rite of passage” for 
less experienced employees. To this end, participation in these events provides those with 
less experience an opportunity to interact with more experienced individuals, highlight-
ing the importance of flexibility, rather than constancy, of practice and appreciation for 
the ambiguity of their work (La Porte & Consolini, 1991). At the same time, however, less 
experienced individuals play a key role in facilitating questions and challenging the cur-
rent understanding. Indeed, the blending of more and less experienced workers aligns 
with the idea that organizational knowledge can be “increased if more levels of experience 
are connected, as when newcomers who take nothing for granted interrelate more often 
with old-timers who think they have seen it all” (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 366). In Marion, 
the interaction between more and less experienced allows individuals to remain open to 
new insights and creates a context in which new knowledge can emerge:
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When I started working in the KB plant I had a manager who really helped me and with 
whom I did all the electrical things, on the same machine . . . he’s a man with great ex-
perience and knowledge and I owe him a lot, as far as my present experience.
Although experience is critical in nonroutine events, it is through the enactment of 
that experience that new knowledge emerges. As individuals engage in questioning and 
coordination, they also consider what an appropriate action might be. Because the prob-
lem they face is not fully known, the most appropriate action is often difficult to identify. 
Individuals must discover the appropriate action based on questioning and coordination, 
and observe what happens after action occurs. Paradox exists because premature action 
can lead to deadly consequences. However, without action, only limited insight is pos-
sible, constrained by previous knowledge structures that only suggest what the event is 
not. Thus, in nonroutine events, action changes the nature of the problem. This process 
of problem solution in the collective-level paradox ultimately shapes knowledge emer-
gence in this HRO:
Proposition 2a: In HROs, the interaction of individuals with diverse experiences creates a par-
adox needed for knowledge emergence while decreasing the possibility of error.
Proposition 2b: In HROs, knowledgeable action triggers the knowledge emergence process 
while decreasing the possibility of error.
Individuals in Marion have extensive knowledge about most everything they do. How-
ever, even a brief moment of inattentiveness and belief that their knowledge is complete 
can result in catastrophic consequences. Individuals in HROs must be “synoptic while 
knowing that they can never fully achieve [full knowledge]” (La Porte & Consolini, 1991: 
29). In this context, they must proactively analyze, search, and question their knowledge 
before, during, and after the event has taken place. After the emergence of new knowl-
edge, the formalization stage ensues in which the new knowledge becomes formalized 
and integrated with the organizational knowledge system.
Phase 2 of the Knowledge Creation Process: Formalization of New Knowledge
The integration of new knowledge into the organization’s existing knowledge system is 
an important step in the knowledge creation process (Coff et al., 2006; Nonaka & Takeu-
chi, 1995). To leverage emergent knowledge, an organization must be able to scale and 
formalize it (Coff et al., 2006). As illustrated in Figure 1, in Marion, the knowledge for-
malization phase of the knowledge creation process follows two paths. New knowledge 
created during routine events is integrated in the informal knowledge structure of each 
power plant. We term this knowledge structure informal because it is not formally cod-
ified. It exists in a collective understanding of “how things should be done” and entails 
only minor adjustments to formal procedures. The informal knowledge structure enables 
individuals to “bend the rules” when needed and adjust formal procedures to the situation 
(i.e., contribute to and enable flexible experience). Alternatively, new knowledge created 
during nonroutine events is immediately formalized and becomes a “binding rule for all.”
The informal knowledge structure (Dimension 6 of the knowledge creation process) De-
spite efforts to standardize practices, each plant approaches its activities and operations 
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somewhat differently. Those variations stem from the unique history of routine events in 
each plant. Each routine event encompasses natural variations requiring adjustments in 
the patterns of actions (Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & Rindova, 2012). Consequently, as 
individuals apply their knowledge in routine events, they also adjust it to the specific cir-
cumstances (March, 1991; Schulz, 2001). This adjustment increases flexibility of expe-
rience and builds the informal knowledge structure: a collection of well-understood, yet 
not formally documented, activities for operation. To this end, the informal knowledge 
structure in the plants and across the system exists within the interplay of past knowl-
edge, present circumstances, and future expectations. An engineer described it as “expe-
rience that is transferred through generations and not possible to learn from the book.”
Over time, individuals might launch initiatives to formalize useful informal practices, 
thus expanding the formal knowledge base. Launch of these initiatives by individuals 
is part of organizational practice. It is the institutionalized manner in which flexibility, 
changeability, and continuous development of the formal knowledge structure takes place. 
Procedures, although necessary in this context, must be continuously reevaluated to re-
main relevant to new contingencies. In Marion, individuals continuously work to bring 
forward new knowledge and insight and distribute it throughout the organization. Infor-
mal knowledge structures are thus an important platform from which individuals chal-
lenge the formal knowledge structure:
The initiative can come from any one engineer to regulate something . . . if that is 
something that is perceived as important but it is not a part of the procedure cur-
rently . . . the engineer would recommend to us to formalize this particular practice.
The formal knowledge structure (Dimension 7 of the knowledge creation process). Proce-
dures that compose the formal knowledge structure are codified activities that guide re-
liable operation in Marion. Whereas some informants described the procedures as “lim-
iting,” all individuals recognized their necessity. In a casual conversation, one engineer 
even described how he often resisted initiatives for standardization and development of 
the systemwide formal knowledge structure. He believed that procedures diminish the 
flexibility necessary for reliable performance. However, he stated that he now understands 
the importance of the procedures to the everyday operation of his power plant. These pro-
cedures facilitate both the awareness of an event, as well as the initial action aimed at so-
lution selection or generation.
In Marion, new knowledge is formalized in one of two ways. In routine events, indi-
viduals launch an initiative to formalize practices from the informal knowledge structure 
and integrate them into the formal one. In contrast, new knowledge stemming from non-
routine events is immediately considered and formalized. Previous research suggests that 
organizations might not always capitalize on knowledge created during past problems be-
cause of hindsight bias, or the tendency to overestimate the amount of information needed 
to resolve the problem (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). In Marion, this bias is minimized because 
once the nonroutine event is neutralized, those involved immediately engage in a series 
of meetings to dissect the issue and record everything that transpired during the event. 
For example, after the nonroutine event described above occurred, the plant manager im-
mediately convened a series of meetings with other plant managers and executives. Dur-
ing these meetings, they discussed what happened during the event, whether the action 
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taken was appropriate, and how to define the issue. An informant from the LIM system 
described the process to us as “local meetings”:
We hold the local meetings with all four power plants at the [LIM] headquarters. We 
all have to be present: power plant manager, lead engineer, heads of technical service, 
as well as technicians . . . we introduce the issue, and the lead engineer clarifies is-
sues from the report. We discuss all the things that happened during the day, what was 
done, etc. Depending on the issue, we then forward our suggestion to the BB board.
“Local meetings” are a defining characteristic of HROs. For example, La Porte and Con-
solini (1991) reported that employees conduct reporting sessions (what they term “hot 
washups”) immediately after error identification as well as a series of debriefings dur-
ing which employees discuss lessons learned. Similarly, Carroll et al. (2002) discussed 
“problem investigations” as a critical aspect of corrective action programs. Our findings 
indicate that local meetings are indeed important for the formalization of emergent un-
derstanding (i.e., lessons learned) and codification of new knowledge within the formal 
knowledge structure. Where our findings depart from previous literature is that, in Mar-
ion, local meetings are not necessarily error-driven. The most relevant knowledge stems 
from the nonroutine events that were appropriately handled and were error-free. During 
these meetings, the nonroutine event is further scrutinized, formalized, and integrated 
into the formal knowledge structure.
Collective-level paradox: Paradox of practice in the knowledge creation process. Coex-
istence of the formal and informal structures gives rise to the paradox of practice in the 
knowledge formalization phase (Figure 2). Individuals incorporate both informal and 
formal procedures in their practice to have more complete, although often paradoxical, 
knowledge. The knowledge is paradoxical because the procedures are incomplete, only 
partially connected, and occasionally opposing. Formal and informal procedures are by 
definition incomplete because complete knowledge in HROs can never be fully attained 
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson et al., 2009). Furthermore, because informal pro-
cedures are more malleable, over time the gap between them and the formal procedures 
widens. As a consequence, individuals must be mindful of these differences and navi-
gate them with care. Finally, formal and informal knowledge can also be opposing. Par-
tially due to the widening gap and partially due to the rigidity of the formal bureaucracy, 
informal practices take a different form, thus allowing individuals to “play the system.” 
For example, when asked to describe his activities, a plant manager read his job descrip-
tion, smiled, then asked, “Now, do you want to hear what I really do?” Employees con-
tinuously interweave both formal and informal knowledge structures into their activities 
to preserve the emergent nature of knowledge necessary for reliable operation of their 
plants. Given this, we propose,
Proposition 3a: HROs are characterized by the interwoven formal and informal knowl-
edge structures that at least partially oppose one another.
Proposition 3b: In HROs, interrelating formal and informal procedures facilitates error-
free discovery in the knowledge creation process, thus increasing the reliability of 
HROs.
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Organizational-level paradox: Paradox of organizing in the knowledge creation process. 
HROs are paradoxical because they embody characteristics that are relatively discrete 
in more mainstream organizations: certainty versus uncertainty, application of current 
knowledge versus new discovery, hierarchical versus decentralized processes, and so on 
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991; McIver et al., 2013). HROs have interdependent, tightly cou-
pled structures necessary for reliable application of current knowledge, but are also flexi-
ble and able to absorb new insights stemming from nonroutine events. Indeed, individuals 
in Marion continually oscillate between what they know and what they must discover. To 
this end, our findings indicate that what makes the knowledge creation process in HROs 
like Marion unique is that the paradox of organizing shapes the entire process. The para-
dox of organizing arises from tensions embedded in (a) the pervasive interdependencies 
of the system and (b) the unpredictable yet hierarchical structure (Figure 2).
Interdependencies of the system contribute to the dangerous nature of HROs (Perrow, 
1984). Specifically, because different segments in the system (machines, other equipment, 
people, and plants) are closely connected and often dependent on each other for proper 
performance, problems are more likely to escalate. Accidents occur most often not from 
one malfunctioning part or human error but from the interaction of diverse components 
that are closely linked (Leveson et al., 2009). However, what remains unclear is the na-
ture of the interdependence in HROs and how that interdependence escalates danger on 
one hand and shapes knowledge as a reliability-inducing process on the other (Leveson 
et al., 2009).
Our findings indicate that interdependence is multilevel because it permeates indi-
viduals, collectives, and the structure of the organization and paradoxical because it 
operates in opposing directions depending on the level it permeates. For individuals 
and collectives, interdependence is embedded in the collective recombination of expe-
riences occurring not just during routine and nonroutine events, but also in everyday 
practices. Physical separation of offices is practically nonexistent (managers’ offices are 
on the plant floor) and individuals tend to spend more time on the floor of the plant or 
in communal areas than in their respective offices. For example, one of the engineers 
made a remark during our conversation: “Earlier today I went to the plant [within the 
LIM system] that just went through unplanned repairs because one of the aggregates 
was acting up. I got to see how it worked out.” In other words, interdependence at the 
individual and collective levels facilitates knowledge creation and transfer, increasing 
the reliability of Marion.
In contrast, interdependence at the structural level increases the complexity of the 
plants (Perrow, 1999) and contributes to the potential escalation of nonroutine events, 
decreasing the reliability of Marion. At the structural level, interdependence is reflected 
in the manner the plants are constructed (physical interdependence) as well as their mu-
tual dependence on natural resources (natural interdependence). Physical interdepen-
dence exists in close, daily interaction of machines and employees. Machines are heavy, 
are large, and have multiple interacting parts necessary for adjustment to the volatility 
of the demand for energy. For example, the pump-storage plant in the BB system has sev-
eral interacting parts that take on different roles depending on the demand for electric-
ity. Natural interdependence extends beyond the organization and is embedded within 
the landscape in which the plants are located. A plant manager explained that under-
standing natural interdependence is pertinent to the reliable performance of the system:
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All four plants [in the LIM system] are each a story in itself but are all hydrologically 
related. If one experiences irregularities, the other may not have enough water in the 
lake. . . . So in the system, [name of the] plant is the most important in terms of power 
production, but they all need to function properly in order to maintain the voltage in 
the network.
Building on these findings, we propose,
Proposition 4a: Interdependence between individuals and collectives facilitates the knowl-
edge creation process, increasing the reliability of HROs.
Proposition 4b: Interdependence in the structure increases the complexity of the organiza-
tion and possibility for large-scale errors, decreasing the reliability of HROs.
Tensions also surface from the organizational hierarchy. In its emphasis on high reli-
ability, Marion is organized as a bureaucracy focused on the application of current pro-
cedures and top-down control. Individuals in Marion see standardized and strictly pre-
scribed practices as key to reliable performance. Deviation from standard procedure is 
considered extremely dangerous and strongly discouraged. In this context, focus is placed 
on structured and rigid routines and repetition of current procedures rather than explora-
tion for novelty (McIver et al., 2013). The standardization of practices and stringent con-
trols ensure that everyone knows “what to do” because failures may “cost human lives.” 
One of our participants explained,
The most important thing is to know what to do and what not to do, because this is 
very powerful equipment and any error would cause great damage and possibly stop-
page of the whole plant, and if they do not take this into account, people may also lose 
lives and so we need to take care of people who work here daily.
However, in addition to being dangerous and highly controlled, HROs are also contin-
ually evolving and relatively unpredictable. HROs are reliable precisely because they cap-
italize on the benefits of bureaucracy (i.e., stringent control systems) while avoiding the 
inertia of continuous restructuring that often accompanies bureaucracies (Bigley & Rob-
erts, 2001). Individuals in Marion often experience multiple issues that interact in a com-
plex manner— complex because the origin of the issue may not be fully comprehendible 
a priori and because issues surface simultaneously (or almost simultaneously). As one of 
our participants explained, the plant is “a living thing”:
The power plant is a process, a living thing, always something happening, you should 
strive to be technically correct and safe and to address each and every element, as well 
as equipment maintenance, hazardous substances are always an issue. And then there is 
high-speed, mass, power, it is quite complex.
Our findings illustrate the paradox of organizing in HROs that operate in the tension 
of a hierarchical, yet adaptive, structure. The paradox of organizing exists because HROs 
necessarily operate with a stringent rule-based hierarchy despite their continuously chang-
ing, unpredictable context (McIver et al., 2013). Individuals in HROs must navigate this 
paradox of control versus adaptation as they create new knowledge. Building on these 
findings, we propose,
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Proposition 4c: Tensions arising from the rule-based hierarchy and the continuously chang-
ing, unpredictable nature of HROs give rise to the paradox of organizing.
Proposition 4d: The paradox of organizing in HROs permeates the organization and shapes 
the entire knowledge creation process.
Discussion
Contemporary organizations are fundamentally complex and dynamically permeated 
by numerous nested paradoxes (Coff et al., 2006; Lado et al., 2006; Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
To understand contemporary organizations is to understand how paradoxical tensions 
may be nested, how they scale, and how paradoxes at one level (e.g., individual) shape 
those at another (e.g., collective) (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Problematizing organizational 
paradoxes allows us to build theories that more fully mirror the complexity faced by con-
temporary organizations (Eisenhardt, 2000). In this study, we focus on knowledge cre-
ation as a fundamental paradox in HROs. Knowledge is created in paradox because, on 
one hand, it enables one to handle events in the most appropriate manner while ensur-
ing reliability and stability needed for optimal functioning of any organization. On the 
other hand, however, if not continuously challenged, overreliance on current knowledge 
may prevent the exploration needed to remain responsive to changes in the internal and 
external environments.
In this study, we discover a nuanced approach to knowledge creation that incorpo-
rates two dynamic paths within three levels of paradox. Whereas previous research has 
tended to underplay the paradoxical nature of knowledge, our findings indicate that par-
adox is critical to understanding how individuals transcend the boundaries of current un-
derstanding and generate novelty. Perhaps our most relevant contribution is the creation 
of a framework of knowledge creation in organizations that explicates the paradoxes em-
bedded within. We organize our discussion around (a) insights with regard to the nature 
of HROs and how those insights may enrich our understanding of non-HROs and (b) in-
sights with regard to the paradoxes in the knowledge creation process and how those in-
sights might extend to non-HROs.
The Nature of High-Reliability Organizations
HROs exhibit a unique organizational context (Roberts, 1990) that may provide theo-
retical insights applicable to a wide range of complex organizations. Yet surprisingly little 
empirical research has been devoted to understanding their uniqueness. For example, al-
though their tight coupling and interdependence are identified as key facilitators of haz-
ard (Leveson et al., 2009), there is insufficient understanding of why. Similarly, there is 
only fractured understanding of what makes HROs reliable. In this study, we empirically 
illustrate the nature of tight coupling and interdependence in an HRO as well as iden-
tify continuous knowledge creation, rather than redundancy, as a key platform for reli-
able performance.
Our findings illustrate two facets of interdependence—collective interdependence and 
structural interdependence—that operate in opposition. Collective interdependence en-
ables individuals in HROs to engage in diverse knowledge practices and prevent major 
failures. In contrast, structural interdependence increases the complexity of the plants 
(Perrow, 1984) and contributes to the escalation of hazardous events. By explicating the na-
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ture of the structural interdependence and providing insight into its two distinct forms—
physical and natural—we extend current understanding of HROs (Leveson et al., 2009).
Our findings also suggest that continuous knowledge creation facilitates reliable per-
formance. HROs are strict bureaucracies because this structure allows them to exploit 
current resources and apply predetermined procedures most appropriately (March, 1991; 
Roberts, 1990). At the same time, our findings indicate that HROs often experience non-
routine events that cannot be resolved using existing knowledge. When this occurs, in-
dividuals must generate novel solutions through careful interweaving of current knowl-
edge with tentative exploration. The process of new knowledge creation not only allows 
individuals to neutralize potential failures before they occur but also permits the collec-
tive to build a repertoire of knowledgeable practices that allows them to notice and rec-
ognize potential cues to failure. Thus, to understand what makes organizations reliable 
is to understand how they create new knowledge amid potential danger.
Extension to non-HROs. Non-HROs tend to value reliability and embody paradoxical 
characteristics as well, although to a lesser degree. To this end, insights from HROs may 
be useful for theorizing how multiple paradoxes are managed as well as how high lev-
els of reliability are achieved without sacrificing search and exploration. This is impor-
tant because, as Lado et al. (2006: 115) recognize, “companies may succeed or fail based 
on differences in their capabilities to manage paradox.” We offer two theoretical insights 
that may extend understanding of non-HROs: (a) the paradox of stability and change and 
(b) the dynamism of reliability.
We uncover how non-HROs work through the paradox of organizing exemplified in 
the tension between the need for stability and the need for change (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
Similar to HROs, non-HROs struggle with incorporating variance-inducing practices such 
as innovation and flexibility with variance-reducing practices such as reliability and rou-
tines (Farjoun, 2010; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Simple separation, however, provides 
only an imperfect solution—bureaucracies can be flexible (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Mi-
losevic & Bass, 2014) and structures may be instrumental for creativity and innovation 
(Harrison & Rouse, 2014; Pentland et al., 2012). Our findings contribute to this stream of 
research by empirically illustrating how bureaucracies achieve flexibility and how con-
straints facilitate new knowledge creation. We show how individuals interweave stan-
dard operating procedures with the discovery process to generate new knowledge and in-
tegrate it with the organizational knowledge system. In doing so, we illustrate the nested 
nature of the stability/change paradox that permeates most contemporary organizations 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011).
Our findings also provide insight into the concept of reliability. In HROs, reliability sig-
nifies failure-free performance. For non-HROs, reliability is evident in consistent service, 
stability of core activities, or even the ability to bounce back from environmental shocks 
(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Farjoun, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2012). However, in contrast to 
research that portrays reliability as a stability-oriented, variance decreasing mechanism, 
our findings indicate that maintaining reliability is a daunting task requiring continuous 
awareness and proactive work. Individuals engage in numerous microadaptations to ac-
commodate emergent unplanned events and deliver consistency (Turner & Rindova, 2012). 
We extend this insight by illustrating how individuals manage paradoxes inherent in these 
microadaptations through initial inquiry and coordination. Indeed, initial inquiry and co-
ordination may be key facets of knowledge creation even in failure-tolerant organizations
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Paradoxes in the knowledge creation process. A critical contribution lies within the dis-
covery of three levels of paradox that individuals experience and navigate to create new 
knowledge. To this end, our findings align with previous research by showing that the 
continuous interaction between less and more experienced individuals is important and 
that continual awareness enables employees to recognize dangerous signals and appro-
priately classify them as novel or not (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Our findings also align 
with the notion that new knowledge integration with the current system is integral to the 
knowledge creation process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Matusik & Heeley, 2005; Nonaka 
& Von Krogh, 2009).
We extend theory by providing a framework of knowledge creation that explicates three 
levels of paradox—paradox of knowing, paradox of practice, and paradox of organizing. 
Paradox of knowing occurs when individuals experience a deviation in their work that re-
quires them to simultaneously utilize their current knowledge, challenge what they know, 
and engage in initial inquiry to generate preliminary insights into the deviation. Paradox of 
practice exists in the space between old and new knowledge in both the knowledge emer-
gence phase (between individuals) and the knowledge formalization phase (between the 
formal and informal knowledge structures). The interplay of formal and informal struc-
tures in the paradox of practice gives rise to the overall malleability of the organizational 
knowledge system, which is necessary for reliable performance.
Finally, the paradox of organizing embodies the larger organizational context in which 
knowledge creation is situated. Centralization and procedural control at the organizational 
level can coexist with individual discovery and the ability to change the system at the in-
dividual level. They are interrelated, creating the paradox of organizing that individuals 
experience and navigate to create new knowledge and ensure continuous reliability. In 
HROs, individuals might ignore prescribed procedures when those procedures are cate-
gorized as unsafe or irrelevant to the given circumstances (Leveson, 1995). However, ig-
noring prescribed rules can lead to a major catastrophe, and the distinction between the 
two is clear only in hindsight (Leveson et al., 2009). By exploring how individuals inter-
weave contextual contingencies into their knowledge practice, we provide stronger in-
sight into this distinction. Our contribution lies in illustrating the conditions in which ig-
noring procedures enables new knowledge creation and continuous reliability of HROs.
Extension to non-HROs. Experimentation and errors are often portrayed as instrumen-
tal in the knowledge creation process (McIver et al., 2013; Schulz, 2001; Zhao, 2011). In 
this perspective, new knowledge is created as errors are detected, analyzed, and resolved. 
However, this perspective implicitly assumes that because non-HROs are more failure-tol-
erant, the benefits of gaining insight from errors outweigh the costs of making them. As 
a consequence, non-HROs are required to engage in cost/benefit analysis and choose be-
tween their desire for consistency of performance and new knowledge creation. By em-
bracing the paradox perspective, however, organizations may be able to move away from 
either–or thinking and foster the “ability to recognize and accept the interrelated relation-
ship of underlying tensions” (Smith & Lewis, 2011: 391) for a more holistic, yet paradox-
ical approach to knowledge creation.
Doing so is difficult, however, because in an effort to comprehend an increasingly am-
biguous and ever-changing reality, individuals tend to opt for simplicity, creating polar-
ized either–or distinctions (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). As a consequence, when 
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faced with paradox, they often remove, rather than work through, it. They choose activ-
ities that worked in the past, focus on a single choice, and remove opportunities for fur-
ther exploration. This in turn reinforces the rigidity of action and stifles discovery (Lado 
et al., 2006; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Our findings illustrate that individuals do not 
simply follow rules and procedures on one hand, and pursue solution generation on the 
other. Nor do they oscillate between standardized and improvised actions. Rather, through 
coordination, individuals interweave constraints with their own experiences and knowl-
edgeably act to facilitate discovery. Therefore, we provide a more fine-grained depiction 
of how individuals work through paradoxes to create new knowledge.
Limitations
Though the topic of this study is timely and increasingly relevant, there are several 
limitations that should be addressed. First, there are limitations related to the partic-
ularities of our research methodology. Though qualitative methods offer robustness in 
detailed, rich descriptions of organizational life, as observers, immersion in these rich 
details can never be fully appreciated, explicated, or communicated. With regard to this 
particular study, a struggle exists between providing rich description of our findings and 
presenting and connecting them with extant research (Wolcott, 2008). Thus, a limita-
tion of this study, similar to other qualitative research, is achieving “seamless quality” 
while presenting “an adequate level of detail” (Wolcott, 2008: 107). Rather than impos-
ing analytical elements on our study, we embrace the interplay of individuals and con-
text, which forms the knowledge creation process in Marion. We attempt to describe 
this interplay to highlight the importance of studying both when seeking to understand 
knowledge creation in HROs.
Second, in an effort to focus our study, we had to omit several interesting avenues sug-
gested by our data. For example, our findings indicate that “rite of passage” is important to 
knowledge creation because it enhanced reliability in Marion. Future research could inves-
tigate differences in organizational design and strategic human resource practices that fa-
cilitate the rite of passage, enabling continuous knowledge-driven interaction among less 
and more experienced individuals. In addition, our findings indicated that certain indi-
viduals took on informal leadership roles in the knowledge creation process and distrib-
uted knowledgeable practices across the plants. Our data also indicated that conditions 
under which individuals tend to ignore prescribed procedures is important (Leveson et 
al., 2009). To keep focus on the knowledge creation process as a conduit to reliable perfor-
mance, we could not devote significant attention in our narrative to these elements. How-
ever, we do believe these to be fruitful directions for future research. In sum, our findings 
provide important implications for theory but also highlight several avenues for research 
to pursue to extend our understanding of knowledge creation in context.
Conclusion
HROs embody a paradox—their dangerous and dynamic context can generate excep-
tions that require new knowledge without opportunity for learning through failures. And 
so we ask, how is new knowledge created in the context where opportunities for explora-
tion and learning through errors are absent? In pursuing this question, we challenge lin-
ear processes of sequential, identifiable stages of knowledge creation and call for a more 
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dynamic understanding. Our findings offer that knowledge exists in a dynamic interplay 
of experience, actions, and interactions that occur organically as individuals struggle to 
understand problems under intense pressures. In doing so, individuals experience and 
navigate three levels of paradox occurring along one of two paths in which knowledge is 
created. We offer an overarching framework of knowledge creation in context in which 
complete knowledge can never be attained; yet the pursuit of complete knowledge drives 
continuous action to achieve reliable, mistake-free operation.
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